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HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
1. Introduction
The adoption of macroprudential measures across a number of jurisdictions over the
past ten years is an increasingly popular response to the credit-fuelled nature of the
property bubbles which had emerged in the run up to 2007/08. The significant increase
in mortgage credit which preceded the international, financial crisis resulted in the fi-
nancial systems of a number of countries being especially vulnerable to disruptions in
global financial markets experienced at that time. Limits on loan to value (LTV) and
loan to income ratios (LTI) have been used for some time by authorities in Hong Kong,
China, Korea, Singapore, and other emerging market economies as a counter-cyclical
credit tool (Zhang and Zoli, 2016). More recently, regulatory authorities in Hungary,
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Ireland have all adopted these types of macroprudential
measures. These instruments are specifically aimed at curtailing the excess provision
of credit and providing financial buffers for both households and credit institutions to
mitigate the impacts of future downturns in housing markets.
While an increasing array of studies have examined the effectiveness of loan-to-
value and loan-to-income restrictions from a financial stability perspective (Bruno et al.,
2017; Cerutti et al., 2017; Claessens et al., 2013), few have examined the implications of
such measures for household finance and in particular the savings decisions of house-
holds. However, as homeownership remains a strong preference among households in
many economies, it is likely that the introduction, and possible subsequent variation in
macroprudential requirements, will impact the determinants of households savings.
If macroprudential limits on leverage increase the downpayment required by house-
holds, then ceteris paribus, an increase in the households’ savings rate is required. Alter-
natively, households would have to increase the length of time required to accumulate
the deposit. In cases where households are unable to increase the savings rate, or can
but must delay purchase, these households could be seen as savings constrained. As
a consequence, a tightening of macroprudential policies could increase the share of
households who appear constrained.
These mechanisms in a sense provide a proxy for liquidity constraints i.e. house-
holds which need to raise the savings rate to complete a planned purchase due to tighter
credit requirements. Previous research has focused on liquidity constraints for house-
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holds (Carroll and Kimball, 2001; Samwick, 2003; Zeldes, 1989), noting that when a liq-
uidity constraint is added to the standard consumption problem, the resulting value
function exhibits increased prudence around the level of wealth where the constraint
becomes binding. Therefore, the extent to which households experience liquidity con-
straints can have a major impact on their savings decisions and in turn on investment
and consumption. In general, however, due to the paucity of detailed information on
households savings decisions, it is difficult to find empirical evidence of these features.
In this paper, we draw on a novel dataset of household savings which measures
households perceptions as to whether their current savings behaviour is “optimal”. One
challenge of studying savings behaviour among households is the notion that each in-
dividual respondent may react different to a fixed level of savings. Factors such as vari-
ations in family circumstances, planning decisions and expectations of future economy
circumstances can augment the satisfaction particular acts of saving may enable. This
specific dataset, taken from the Economic and Social Research Institute’s Economic
Sentiment Monitor (ESM), allows us to define households as facing savings constraints
if they indicate they are not content with their current savings behaviour. The survey
also allows us to disentangle whether or not households have a demand for housing
and whether their savings behaviour is linked to the need to acquire a downpayment
for the house purchase. We couple this with a quasi-natural experiment through the
unexpected introduction of macroprudential loan-to-value and loan-to-income mea-
sures in the Irish mortgage market to test how the increased downpayment requirement
impacts households’ savings constraints.
More specifically, using these unique, nationally representative survey data from
Irish households, before and after the introduction of the new regulations, we exploit
the variation across households in their exposure to downpayment constraints to test
a) how macroprudential regulations impact household savings constraints and b) how
uncertainty and precautionary behaviour shapes the distributional response to the pol-
icy across households.
In examining the impact of macroprudential policy on savings decisions our con-
tribution builds on a new strand of the literature, which focusses on the role of uncer-
tainty due to policy measures. As is well known, uncertainty is particularly important
in the context of households’ savings with Carroll and Kimball (2006) defining precau-
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tionary saving as resulting from the knowledge that the future is uncertain; households
adjust their savings to smooth consumption over their life cycle. Uncertainty, typically
in the savings literature, has been examined in the context of shocks to labour income,
however, a more recent literature has focussed on the role played by policy uncertainty
(Giavazzi and McMahon (2012)) where political uncertainty in terms of labour market
reform plays a critical role in determining the degree of precautionary behaviour. In
the presence of macroprudential limits on mortgage lending and/or time varying bank
lending standards, households will be uncertain as to the exact level of wealth required
to meet downpayment constraints. Therefore, households with uncertain cash flows,
would be expected, a priori, to increase their savings due to precautionary motives. In
our setting, this would translate into a greater increase in savings constraints for house-
holds with uncertain future cash flows relative to others following the introduction of
the macroprudential measures.
The Irish market is of particular interest in terms of identifying the uncertainty chan-
nel. As noted in McQuinn (2017), amongst OECD countries, the Irish residential sector
experienced the largest increase in house prices over the period 1995 − 2007 and con-
versely suffered the most significant decline in prices between 2008 − 2013. Given the
increases in both prices and activity levels, the housing market, had, by 2007, assumed a
disproportionate importance vis-a´-vis the overall economy with the Irish financial sec-
tor particularly vulnerable to the subsequent international financial downturn. Conse-
quently, the variation in key housing market indicators had significant implications for
Irish households.
In our analysis, we define two groups of savings constrained households: a) Con-
strained Savers - households who are currently saving for a home but feel the savings
they are doing are not adequate and b) Constrained Non-Savers - households who in-
tend to buy a house in the next 2 years but are not actively saving for house purchasing
at present. Using these definitions, our identification strategy is threefold. First, we use
a simple event window analysis which considers the change in constraints before and
after the policy. Second, we take two groups who are suggested by research as being
more exposed to housing downpayment constraints namely younger households, and
those in the private rental sector, and use these groups to apply a quasi-experimental
difference-in-difference method. Third, to test the impact of uncertainty, we follow Gi-
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avazzi and McMahon (2012) and use the public sector/private sector split to distinguish
between households with different cash flow uncertainty. We also use a survey based
indicator for those households who have concerns about future incomes/affordability
as a further means of identifying households with varying degrees of uncertain income.
Our results suggest an increase in the share of constrained households amongst
non-savers following the increase in the policy. These findings are intuitive and in-
dicate the impact of these regulations are borne most by those who intend to buy a
house but are most constrained in their savings behaviour at present. From our quasi-
experimental testing, we find that the effects are largest for younger households and
those in the private rental market. Both are groups of households most likely to face
downpayment constraints when entering the housing market. In terms of uncertainty
we find private sector households are more affected as are those with explicit concerns
around future income affordability. These findings would suggest that uncertainty ex-
acerbates the constraint channel following a downpayment shock.
There is also another potential explanation that may exacerbate the effect we find
over and above that of a credit constraints shock. We find active savers were unaf-
fected and non-saving potential buyers were more constrained and this may relate to
the parametrisation of the macroprudential regulations in Ireland combined with the
attentiveness of market participants a la Reis (2006). When the regulations in Ireland
were introduced, their calibration was very close to the market credit conditions at that
time.1 In this case, current active savers, who were attentive in terms of absorbing the
information about the regulations would have realised that the payments shock was
not significant. However, inattentive purchasers who would not have been as familiar
with the additional financial constraints imposed by the policy perceive the shock to be
much more significant.2
To test the robustness of our findings, we undertake two important tests. First, we
include controls for the economic cycle that vary by time and region to ensure that our
findings are not driven by any change in underlying economic trends. Second, we en-
1Kinghan et al. (2019) found a marginal tightening of credit for high income first time buyers of between
1-2 percentage points of LTV.
2In the institutional and individual responses to the introduction of the regulations, consid-
erable emphasis was on whether homeownership would ever be feasible for first time buyers.
https://www.centralbank.ie/publication/consultation-papers/consultation-paper-detail/cp87-macro-
prudential-policy-for-residential-mortgage-lending
4
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
sure that the two treatment groups that we use (younger households and those in the
rental sector) were not themselves affected by the regulatory change by using a multi-
nomial logit inverse probability weighting technique as presented by Stuart et al. (2014)
and used by McCann and O’Toole (2019) to deal with a similar issue relating to macro-
prudential policy. In both cases, our baseline results are robust to the additional con-
trols.
Our findings have important implications for the political economy acceptance of
a mortgage-based macroprudential regime. In some cases, the introduction of loan-
to-value and loan-to-income regulations can be perceived as impairing the ability of
households to “own their own home”3 even if the actual change brought about by the
regulations may be somewhat less severe than expected. In the Irish case, the calibra-
tion of the rules closely to the market credit conditions meant that the actual shock was
not extreme due in particular to the sliding scale rule for LTV and the system of propor-
tionate allowances. Our findings suggest that savings constraints increased for younger,
renting households exactly those households most expected to be affected based on ex-
isting research. From a policy perspective, clear communication of the impacts of the
regulations on such borrowers may increase the political economy acceptance of the
measures and ensure such frameworks are long lasting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the role of uncertainty
in household savings literature before clarifying Ireland’s experience with macropru-
dential policy. Section 3 describes our methodology and dataset. Section 4 details the
empirical findings of our approach while Section 5 deploys robustness checks in order
to verify the validity of these results. The final section summarises our final conclusions
and policy implications, based on these findings.
3Clear evidence can be found for this from the response to consultations by the public, polit-
ical parties, Ministries and government bodies to the proposed introduction of these measures by
the Irish Central Bank which can be found here: https://www.centralbank.ie/publication/consultation-
papers/consultation-paper-detail/cp87-macro-prudential-policy-for-residential-mortgage-lending.
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2. Background and Context
2.1. Macroprudential Regulations As An Uncertain Downpayment Shock
The introduction of macroprudential policy measures after the financial crisis sought to
safeguard the stability of the financial sector by breaking the link between house price
fluctuations, credit growth and banking sector stress (Arregui et al., 2013; Nabar and
Ahuja, 2011; Vandenbussche et al., 2015). A central component of the new policy mea-
sures introduced has been the deployment of borrower-based instruments in the mort-
gage market which limit underlying credit conditions at loan origination. The most
frequently used instruments in this toolkit are loan-to-value and loan-to-income ra-
tios which impose a regulatory downpayment constraint and income affordability limit
respectively.4 Loan-to-value ratios, in particular, require prospective homeowners to
increase liquidity upfront at the time of purchase.
These measures therefore impose regulatory income and downpayment constraints
for households looking to become mortgaged-homeowners. In the literature, there is a
considerable focus on which households face binding downpayment constraints and
the impact on homeownership (Barakova et al., 2014). Our paper is the first to bridge
this traditional literature on downpayment constraints with the impact of macropru-
dential policy on household savings.
In 2015, given the strong pick-up in Irish house prices apparent since 2013, the Cen-
tral Bank of Ireland announced the introduction of macro-prudential measures aimed
at preventing the emergence of another credit bubble. A full outline of these regula-
tions can be found in Keenan et al. (2016) however a short summary at this juncture is
useful. The regulations limited the maximum loan-to-value ratio for first time buyers
to 90 per cent for house purchases under 220,000 and to 80 per cent for every euro over
220,000. Kinghan et al. (2019) show this led to a LTV shock of approximately 2 percent-
age points overall. Second time buyers were subject to a maximum 80 per cent loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios. A system of proportionate allowances was also introduced such
that lenders could exempt 15 per cent of total lending from the regulations. In addition
4Other measures can include specific limits on debt-service ratios or loan term restrictions. These
macroprudential measures were adopted on a widespread basis in Asian economies following the onset of
the financial crisis in 1997 (Zhang and Zoli, 2016).
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to the LTV restrictions, a loan-to-income restriction of 3.5 times gross income was also
implemented. Proportionate allowances to this rule allowed 20 per cent of total lending
to be exempt from this measure. While welcome from a financial stability perspective,
these policy measures do, for a number of reasons, increase the degree of uncertainty
for prospective homeowners:
1. The measures, when introduced, were unanticipated and, as such, can be seen as an exogenous
increase in credit constraints,
2. Uncertainty about the actual application of the measures; financial institutions may grant exemp-
tions to a certain number of households, who would then not face any downpayment or income
limits. However, it is unclear which households would be eligible,
3. The possibility that the regulations may change in the future.5
In all of these cases, the rules counted as an actual increase in credit constraints in
the mortgage market in Ireland. It is also likely that borrowers with a greater degree
of uncertainty in forecasting their cash flows would be more likely to feel a heightened
uncertainty when the rules were introduced.
With these considerations, the heterogeneous impacts of these policies across house-
holds are likely to be significant; given differences in the distribution of income and
wealth across the economy, it is unlikely that a uniform effect would be found. Two
particular factors are likely to attenuate the impact for specific borrower groups: a)
their relative demand for homeownership and degree of financing constraints and b)
uncertainty. For the former group, it is likely younger borrowers and those in the pri-
vate rental market looking to purchase homes would be most affected.
2.2. Precautionary Behaviour, Uncertainty and Household Savings
An important feature of our research is to examine the impact of uncertainty due to
downpayment shocks. The literature on precautionary behaviour and savings is partic-
ularly important in that regard.
The role of uncertainty and, particularly, that of the precautionary motive in influ-
encing savings has received considerable treatment from both a theoretical and em-
5Subsequently, the Central Bank of Ireland announced an annual review of the measures, where certain
changes have been made.
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pirical perspective. Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) were amongst the first studies
to provide an analytical framework illustrating how savings could be a positive func-
tion of future income uncertainty. Skinner (1988), Dynan (1993) and Banks et al. (2001)
all analyse the magnitude of the precautionary effect using Euler equations, while Ca-
ballero (1991) and Deaton (1991) provide further theoretical justification for the pres-
ence of the precautionary motive - the latter focussing on the interaction between the
precautionary effect and borrowing constraints.
From an empirical perspective, a significant number of studies at the micro-household
level provide support for precautionary savings, these include Carroll (1997), Engen and
Gruber (2001), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003), Kennickell and Lusardi
(2004), and Deidda (2014).
More recently, the potential causes of uncertainty have been broadened out to in-
clude policy or political considerations; Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) examine the im-
plications for German household savings due to potential labour market reforms, while
Aaberge et al. (2017) find that an increase in political uncertainty resulted in significant
temporary increases in savings amongst urban Chinese households in 1989.
Our contribution to this literature is to further shed light on the uncertainty-savings
relationship and show that households with greater income uncertainty are more af-
fected by downpayment constraints when trying to save for home purchase.
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3. Data and Identification Strategy
3.1. Data and Measurement
Table 1: Overview of Savings Indicators
Variable Definition
Saveti Variable = 1 if household saves either regularly or occasionally,
0 otherwise
SaveHouseti Variable = 1 if household is saving to purchase a house,
0 otherwise
PotentialBuyerti Variable = 1 if non-saving household intends to purchase a home
within two years,
0 otherwise
ConHouseti Variable = 1 if saving for a house or a potential buyer
& is not satisfied with its current level of saving
0 otherwise
ConSaveHouseti Variable = 1 if household saving to buy a house
& is not satisfied with its current level of saving
0 otherwise
ConPotentialBuyerti Variable = 1 if household intends to buy a home within two years
& is not satisfied with its current level of saving
0 otherwise
The first set of dependent variables takes into account different forms of savings be-
haviour, distinguishing between savers and their motivations. Saveit draws from a sur-
vey question of ”Do you save regularly, occasionally or not at all these days?” The vari-
able is set as a dummy where, irrespective of saving frequency, any form of saving sets
’Save’ equal to one. SaveHouseit identifies ”What are you saving for?”, where the selec-
tion of choices includes ’To buy or renovate a home’, ’To make a large purchase’, ’For a
holiday’, ’For a special event’, ’For education’, ’In case my income falls in the future’ and
’To have something put by for unexpected expenses’. Whether or not individuals are
saving for buying/renovating their homes acts as our second dependent dummy vari-
able, wherein respondents with a value equal to one are saving for a home. Our third
dependent variable, PotentialBuyerit is equal to one when an individual who does not
save indicates they intend to purchase a home within two years.
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The second set of dependent variables focuses on those interested in the housing
market and identifies savings constrained individuals within this subset of the sam-
ple. This takes into account whether or not respondents are satisfied with their current
level of savings, inclusive of savers and non-savers. ConSaveHouseit acts as a subset of
SaveHouseit, focusing on savers experiencing a savings constraint. ConPotentialBuyerit
is a subset of PotentialBuyerit, identifying those unsatisfied with their status as non-
savers within the group. ConHouseit combines both of these dummy variables, identi-
fying savings constrained individuals saving for a home as well as non-savers expressing
a constraint while simultaneously signalling their intent to purchase a home within 2
years.
These six dummy variables will feature as dependent variables in the models of the
identification strategy. When identifying heterogeneous effects, the empirical section
will highlight differences among the set of three constrained dummy variables.
Figure 1 displays a flow chart of dependent variable groups. After households are
classified between saving and not saving, further classifications indicate whether the
household is “interested” in the housing market either through specifically saving for a
house or through indications of being a potential buyer within the next two years. For
both types of housing market participants we examine the likelihood of experiencing
savings constraints.
Our main hypothesis under examination is that the share of constrained households
(with some demand for housing) increases following the introduction of the measures.
In the graphic this would be identified by an increase of the share of households indi-
cating they are constrained within the groups House Saver and Potential Buyer.
3.2. Identification Strategy
Our research question involves testing whether the introduction of macroprudential
policy measures led to an increase in the degree to which Irish households perceived
savings constraints to be binding. Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, our ap-
proach to identification is twofold. To estimate the average effect of the policy change,
we a) undertake a simple event study and b) use specific groups suggested by theory
and existing literature as quasi-natural control groups.
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3.2.1. Event study analysis
As presented in Table 1, the saving indicator in all four cases is binary and therefore
requires the use of a probability model. Before identifying heterogeneities between dif-
ferent focus groups, we establish a baseline model to capture the average policy effect
whilst controlling for key variables. We use a standard logit model with pooled cross-
sectional data which tests the effects of the introduction of the policy in the Irish mort-
gage market.
Pr(SC = 1)ti = α+ β1Post+ ωX
t
i + θt + θr + 
t
i (1)
Where i identifies the individual respondents and tdate based on the specific month
and year each observation was collected. The vector Xti controls for individual aspects
of individuals reported through the survey. Baseline controls include fixed effects for
the month (θt) and region (θr) as well as a host of borrower controls based on demo-
graphic details. These include fixed effects for respondent gender, education status,
marital status, housing tenure, number of children, occupation, and working status.
We also include the age in years of the household head (respondent). A full listing of
these variables can be found in appendix 1. Additionally, we include controls for the
personal financial positions of individuals, their future expectations of their personal
finances, and expectations towards the labour market.
The critical variable for our identification strategy is the dummy, Post. This indica-
tor variable takes a value of 1 for any response captured after the 9th of February 2015
when the macroprudential regulations were introduced and a 0 otherwise. As per our
main hypotheses, we would expect that, if the regulations have increased household
perceptions of savings contraints, then β1 > 0. The time window that we explore is 18
months either side of the introduction of the measures.
3.2.2. Quasi-Natural Difference-in-Difference
Once a series of baseline estimates are achieved, the model is then used in order to
evaluate how different focus groups, represented by the dummy term Z, were affected
by the introduction of macroprudential policy measures, relative to their counterparts.
11
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
As part of the identification strategy, we will explore heterogeneities occurring across
age and private renters. Indeed, younger households and those with no current wealth
built up in a property (wealth constrained) have been found in the existing literature to
have been most affected by downpayment constraints (Acolin et al., 2016; Haurin et al.,
1998; Barakova et al., 2014).
Using these characteristics, we split our data into two groups: Young (< 43)6 vs Old;
Renter vs Homeowner. We then use these two groups in a quasi difference-in-difference
the explore their relative exposure to the policy treatment.
This approach imposes quasi difference-in-difference estimator method upon the
standard logit model:
Pr(SC = 1)ti = α+ β1Post+ β2Z + β3Post× Z + ωXti + θt + θr + it (2)
where Z relates to household age or rental market status.
The Economic Sentiment Monitor also captures useful proxies for income uncer-
tainty. Other information in the survey reveals an individual’s employment status and
sector of employment. From this information, we are able to distinguish between pub-
lic and private sector employees. This can be a useful proxy for income uncertainty
as in Giavazzi and McMahon (2012), as private sector workers generally cannot predict
their future incomes as accurately as employees. Public servants are assumed to benefit
from greater job security relative to those employed in the private sector. We therefore
run a similar model to above using the public/private split to identify whether private
sector workers are more affected by the policy.
One benefit from using the public/private split in terms of identifying the policy
impacts are that the risk of endogeneity between the policy and employment status is
low i.e. it is unlikely that many households changed their sector of employment as a
response to the policy. If this were to happen, it would bias the estimated effect on
constraints by shifting the group composition.
Finally, as a robustness check, we develop an alternative indicator of uncertainty
which draws on a self reported risk identifier in the survey. We flag households as fac-
6Age 43 is the age which represents the bottom 25 per cent of our data.
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ing income uncertainty if they report that affordability/income issues are the main risk
they face at present. This metric is more likely to be affected by the policy so the pub-
lic/private split is our prefered model.
3.3. Summary Statistics
In evaluating the effects of the macroprudential policy measures, it is first important to
review the distribution of market participant groups across the sample. Table 2 presents
an overview of the distributions under pre- and post-policy conditions on the basis of
the different dependent variables. Pre- and post-policy time windows capture observa-
tions between August 2013 and July 2016 resulting in an 18 month time window in the
pre- and post-policy periods.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Saver Data
Pre-Policy Post-Policy
Saveti 0.596 0.646
(0.491) (0.478)
SaveHouseti 0.059 0.066
(0.299) (0.302)
PotentialBuyerti 0.102 0.094
(0.434) (0.442)
ConHouseti 0.094 0.090
(0.492) (0.496)
ConSaveHouseti 0.025 0.024
(0.494) (0.481)
ConPotentialBuyerti 0.070 0.066
(0.464) (0.457)
Observations 5,191 5,565
Among savers and non-savers, the majority of the sample (59.6 per cent) has re-
ported either regular or occasional acts of saving before policy implementation. After
the introduction of macroprudential policy however, the number of saving households
13
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increased to 64.6 per cent of the population. Prior to the introduction of these mea-
sures, individuals saving to buy a house accounted for 5.9 per cent of the sample. This
share rose to 6.6 per cent for the post-policy sample.
While the share of individuals interested in saving increases, it does appear fewer
people who are non-saving felt the housing market was affordable following the intro-
duction of the macroprudential policy measures. An average of 10.2 per cent of re-
spondents indicated an interest in purchasing a home within two years, however, when
revisiting this 18-month average following policy introduction, the share of potential
buyers fell to 9 per cent. This may suggest that following a restriction in lending stan-
dards, a specific portion of individuals abandoned plans to purchase a home. Although
the ratio of savings constrained savers to non-savers remained relatively stable between
the two time periods, the general improvement in macroeconomic conditions appears
to have slightly eased savings constraint among respondents.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the regression sample. Overall, there were
10,756 individual household responses over the three year timespan of the analysis.
Roughly half of the sample is female, with 42.8 per cent of respondents maintaining
a third level education. While Dublin captured the largest share of respondents, the
overall distribution of households closely mirrors percentage shares implied by Cen-
sus 2016.7 Approximately 70 per cent of respondents are married, averaging 53 years of
age, most of which are homeowners. Regarding job roles, the majority of households
reported professional or technical occupations as opposed to being employed in man-
ual labour. 13 per cent of households reported themselves as entrepreneurs while 41.2
per cent acted as employees for various companies. Finally, 19.2 per cent of respon-
dents reported expecting financial difficulties over the next twelve months whereas the
remainder reported either a general ease in their financial conditions or as having a
neutral perspective on the matter.
7The Central Statistics Office prepared ’Census 2016 - Part 1’, which provides details on overall pop-
ulation change, age, marital status, households and families, nationalities, foreign languages, the Irish
language, religion and housing.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Controls
Variable Mean Variable Mean
Female=1 50.9% HH no. of adults at work (over 18)
Third level Educ.=1 42.8% 0 29.2%
1 29.7%
Border 10.6% 2+ 41.1%
Dublin 28.8%
Mideast 11.2% Children 31.7%
Midland 5.5% No Children 68.3%
Midwest 7.6%
Southeast 10.6% Occupation
Southwest 16.2% Professional/Technical 57.1%
West 9.7% Manual 42.9%
Married/Partner 69.6% Employee 41.2%
Single 17.6% Self-Employed 13.0%
Widowed/Divorced/Separated 12.8% Other 45.8%
Age 53 Expected Financial Position in 1YR
Difficulty 19.2%
Homeowner 92.7% Neither 68.1%
Private Renter 7.3% Ease 12.7%
Observations 10,756
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4. Empirical Findings
In the following section, we present the main findings from the estimation of equations
(1) and (2). In equation (1), the baseline model of this paper, we capture the overall
effect of the introduction of macroprudential policy on the net change in the likelihoods
of households actively saving. For savers, we also explore how households specifically
saving for a house were affected. Among those households who are non-savers, we
examine how those intending to purchase a home within two years were affected.
We then investigate the heterogeneous effects across age and ownership status to
explore how these constraints were distributed. We use several proxies for different
types of income uncertainties. In particular, we compare savings behaviour across em-
ployment status and different sectors of employment. In the estimates presented in
this section, we narrow in on specific subgroups of the main population in particular
regressions. This explains why the number of observations reported in different speci-
fications changes. All probability models are estimated using a logit model with robust
standard errors.
4.1. Baseline Model
Table 4 presents the estimates of our main specifications for the event window study. In
column (1), we present the coefficient on the Post for the model where the dependent
variable is the share of constrained households who are saving for a house. In column
(2) we present the coefficient on Post with the dependent variable for constrained po-
tential buyers. In column (3) we present the estimate for the pooled sample with both
home savers and potential buyers. In each of these samples, the dependent variable
takes the value of 1 if the household is constrained and 0 otherwise. All models are es-
timated with the vector of household controls, month fixed effects, region fixed effects
and sentiment controls.
The results in Table 4 suggests the introduction of macroprudential measures have
resulted in a greater perceptions of savings constraints. Though there is a 5p.p. increase
in the likelihood of savings constraints across both groups, the effect appears to be
driven by an increase in savings constraints for potential buyers. The post-policy like-
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lihood of experiencing savings constraints as a potential buyer increased by 10.3p.p..
Given that 7 per cent of respondents were constrained potential buyers prior to the
policy, this suggests that, ceteris paribus, macroprudential policy measures resulted in
an X per cent increase in savings constraints pressures on average for potential buyers.
Table 4: Policy Volume Effect - Savings-Constrained Behaviour
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Policy=1 -0.0065 0.1032∗∗ 0.0496∗
(0.047) (0.033) (0.029)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.2. Exploring Heterogeneous Effects
4.2.1. How Were Younger Households Affected?
The permanent income hypothesis indicates that, as an individual ages, they shift from
acting as an intertemporal borrower from their future self towards assuming the role of
the intertemporal lender to their past self (Friedman, 1957). Consumption and the re-
maining portion of savings, are intended to remain smooth over time, with expenditure
levels rationally based on the even distribution of lifetime wealth an individual expects
to generate rather than the current income they earn. Therefore, the increased down-
payment burden introduced by macroprudential policy is expected to be particularly
constraining on younger age groups.
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Results in Table 5 capture a clear disparity emerging regarding the likelihood of sav-
ings constraints among younger and older sections of society. The findings present the
average effect of the treatment for both the treated and control groups of young and old.
Those below the age of 42 appear to be 14.1p.p. more likely to experience savings con-
straints following the introduction of macroprudential policy measures. We do not find
any effect on older households. The fact that constraints are heightened for younger
households following the introduction of a macroprudential shock to downpayments
is in line our expectations as well as the existing literature (Acolin et al., 2016; Haurin
et al., 1998).
Table 5: Differences Across Age for the Savings-Constrained
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Age (< 42)=0 -0.0118 0.0628 0.0372
(0.066) (0.040) (0.037)
Age (< 42)=1 -0.0049 0.1411∗∗ 0.0574
(0.058) (0.049) (0.039)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To provide more granular insight into the effect of age, we interact the post dummy
with a continuous age variable and pull out the average marginal effect of the treatment
at different values of age. The findings are presented in table 6. We find that the effect
is highest for younger households and declines steadily with age. Savings constraints
range from a 7.8p.p. rise at the age of 50 to a peak of 16.6p.p. amongst the youngest
category of potential buyers. The younger the household, the greater the likelihood of
experiencing savings constraint.
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Table 6: Differences Across Age for the Savings-Constrained
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Age = 25 0.0239 0.1659∗∗ 0.0859∗
(0.072) (0.052) (0.045)
Age = 30 0.0124 0.1485∗∗∗ 0.0740∗
(0.060) (0.045) (0.038)
Age = 35 0.0010 0.1310∗∗∗ 0.0621∗
(0.051) (0.039) (0.033)
Age = 40 -0.0103 0.1133∗∗ 0.0503∗
(0.046) (0.035) (0.029)
Age = 45 -0.0214 0.0956∗∗ 0.0384
(0.047) (0.032) (0.027)
Age = 50 -0.0324 0.0776∗∗ 0.0265
(0.053) (0.032) (0.028)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.2.2. How Were Private Renters Affected?
The introduction of policy measures is estimated to have had a significant impact on
renters in particular, when taking into account the likelihood of potential buyers be-
coming savings constrained. According to Table 7, the likelihood of an individual being
constrained increased by 8.9 per cent amongst homeowners and 15.9 per cent among
private renters after the policy measures were introduced.
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Table 7: Differences Across Tenure for the Savings Constrained
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Homeowner 0.0306 0.0892∗∗ 0.0544∗
(0.056) (0.034) (0.031)
Private Renter -0.0872 0.1591∗ 0.0372
(0.082) (0.088) (0.063)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.3. Heterogeneity based on income uncertainty
As has been previously discussed, precautionary savings behaviour may occur as a re-
sult of policy uncertainty (Giavazzi and McMahon, 2012). Given the change in macro-
prudential policy, it is important to observe how savings behaviour varied between
groups with different levels of income uncertainty. Ceteris paribus, the precautionary
savings effect would interact and possibly compete with the demand for a now larger
downpayment. Under this theory, those more likely to be subject to greater income
uncertainty would be particularly exposed to greater savings constraints.
In Table 8 we present the differences between households in different sectors of em-
ployment. It is assumed that greater job security implies greater income uncertainty,
therefore the private sector is expected to be particularly exposed in terms of savings
constraints. We find that macroprudential policy contributed to a 14.3p.p. increase in
the likelihood of potential buyers experiencing a savings constraint, relative to the pub-
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lic sector.
Table 8: Uncertainty: Differences by Employment Sector
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Public Sector -0.0478 0.0851 0.0195
(0.097) (0.103) (0.079)
Private sector 0.0182 0.1427∗∗ 0.0710
(0.069) (0.053) (0.044)
Observations 338 336 678
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As a final proxy for income uncertainty, Table 9 examines responses to what individ-
uals would consider their main risk when approaching the housing market. Those sub-
ject to affordability risks exhibit an increased likelihood of being constrained among po-
tential buyers with an 10.8p.p. increase following the introduction of policy measures.
In both cases, it appears those exposed to greater degrees of income uncertainty reacted
far more strongly following the introduction of macroprudential policy measures. The
combination of requiring a thicker layer of insulation against financial shocks through
greater levels of precautionary saving and the introduction of a policy measure which
placed greater demands on individuals to produce a larger downpayment culminate
into likelihoods of experiencing self-perceived savings constraints.
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Table 9: Uncertainty: Differences by Main Risk
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Affordability Risk=1 -0.1678∗∗ 0.1083∗ -0.0166
(0.077) (0.056) (0.052)
Observations 343 349 696
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5. Robustness Checks
In this section, we present two robustness checks on our estimates. We first explore
whether adding additional controls for the macroeconomic cycle affect our findings.
Second, we attempt to deal with some sample selection issues that may arise due to the
nature of our cross-sectional data.
5.1. Time-Varying Macroeconomic Factors: Adjusting for the Cycle
The variation that identifies our main findings are changes in savings constraints over
time across groups. While our use of theoretically suggested groups as treatment and
control provide for a good identification approach, there is a possibility that changes
across these groups could come through general changes in the macroeconomy that
alters the relative constraints. To control for such changes, we include region-time
varying macroeconomic factors that should account for differences in trends in the lo-
cal economies where the households are residing. The variables we include are house
price growth (∆HPrt−1) and the unemployment rate (UneRatert−1) which should cap-
ture housing market and labour market developments at the region-time level. These
are included in Table 10. Both of these factors are included with a one quarter lag to
the survey period to avoid simultaneity bias. While these variables are insignificant,
the main effect still holds at the 5 per cent significance level. This suggests our find-
ings are not driven by divergent economic trends before and after the regulations were
introduced.
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Table 10: Inclusion of Macro-Time Varying Factors
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
∆HPrt−1 -0.0003 0.0018 0.0011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
UneRatert−1 -0.0021 0.0057 0.0012
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Post -0.0227 0.1105∗∗ 0.0460
(0.059) (0.046) (0.037)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.2. Testing for Sample Selection Effects
Our main analytical evaluation tests the impact of the introduction of macropruden-
tial regulations on savings constraints using both younger households and those in the
rental sector as the treatment groups. While our baseline findings control for a range of
factors including borrower controls, a potential issue arises in relation to whether the
underlying composition of the sample in terms of age or tenure could have shifted as
a consequence of the policy. If this is the case, then using these variables as treatment
groups could lead to some bias in the estimate of the impact of the policy. Indeed, given
the macroprudential regulations were aimed at increasing downpayment constraints it
is likely that the policy may have increased the share of households in the “renting”
category. It is less likely the policies impacted the age structure of the population, in
particular in the short run.
To deal with this particular issue, we draw on an inverse probability weighting ap-
proach suggested by Stuart et al. (2014) for estimating difference-in-difference models
using cross sectional data. The rest of this section presents a short overview of the tech-
nique and the results of the robustness checks.
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5.2.1. Multi-Group Cross Sectional Matching
Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, and the fact that we do not observe the
same households over time, it is likely that in each repeated cross-section, the sam-
ple composition may differ across household characteristics. In particular the share of
renter households or younger households could shift across the survey waves, and in
particular, could have changed after the introduction of the policies. Furthermore, us-
ing age and renter as classification variables could lead to biases if these groups are sys-
tematically different and the difference is linked to credit access or savings behaviour.
If either of these sample issues are occurring then it is likely the estimates are biased
due to the sample selection. Some of the sample selection issues will be controlled for
by the inclusion of the range of covariates in our estimates, however, Stuart et al. (2014)
note that average responses calculated with covariates depend on the distribution of
the data and if treatment variables differ on observables but are not equally balanced
across the data, covariates will not address the issue fully.
To address this issue, we follow McCann and O’Toole (2019) and Kinghan et al.
(2019) by applying the Stuart et al. (2014) inverse probability weighting approach to
match the borrowers on observables across our treatment and control groups before
and after the policy. Our data are split into four groups: pre-policy treated, pre-policy
control, post-policy treated, post-policy control. In our case, treatment is either being
a private renter or being a borrower aged less than 43. A multinomial model is then
estimated on the four groups with a range of covariates included which should control
for the sample selection differences. The predicted probabilities of being in each group
given the multinomial estimates are then used as the weights:
wi =
Pr1(Xi)
Prg(Xi)
(3)
where 1 = (
4∑
g=1
Prg(Xi))∀i (4)
where X are the group of covariates selected and g are the four groups noted above
across each household i. These weights can then be applied as probability weights in
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the second stage logit model. The covariates included in the X vector in this regression
are gender, region, marital status, education, children, work and employment status,
occupation, economic sentiment expectations, views on purchasing activity, financial
stress and expected changes to financial circumstances.
5.2.2. Multinomial Weighted Results
The results of the multinomial weighted logit regressions are presented in Tables 11 and
12. The former presents the estimates for young households and the latter presents the
estimates for private renters. The tables contain the marginal effects of the policy for
young households (renters) for each of the three constraint indicators from a model
including the interaction of age and policy and weighted using the multinomial proba-
bility weights.
The findings indicate that savings constraints increased for younger households and
renters following the introduction of macroprudential policies which is in line with our
main baseline estimates. The results continue to have statistical significance at con-
ventional levels (10%) and the magnitudes are in line with the baseline findings. Given
these results, the issue of sample selection biases from differences in the observable
samples, in the cross section or over time are highly unlikely and, as a consequence,
our findings appear robust.
Table 11: Multinomial Inverse Weight for Young Households: Average Effect
(1) (2) (3)
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Post -0.0151 0.1031∗ 0.0064
(0.039) (0.061) (0.040)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Standard errors in parentheses, p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Multinomial Inverse Weight for Renters: Average Effect
House Saver (Con) Potential Buyer (Con) Constrained
Post -0.0767 0.1425∗ 0.0319
(0.080) (0.082) (0.062)
Observations 662 1,013 1,675
Standard errors in parentheses, p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.3. Testing for Effects on Overall Savings and Potential Buyers
We begin by testing whether or not the rules impacted the share of home savers or the
share of potential buyers in the market. Ruling out changes in these metrics is impor-
tant to identifying the effect of the policy on constraints. If the policy had changed these
underlying groups, any findings on constraints could have been due to differences in
the samples saving for, or looking to purchase, a house.
Tables 13 provides the initial set of estimates from equation 1 where Pr(SC = 1)it
includes savers, house savers and non-saving potential buyers. The term Post corre-
sponds to β1 from equation (1). The interpretation of the coefficients is that, controlling
for borrower specific characteristics 8, there is no significant effect of macroprudential
policy implementation on savings objectives towards the housing market nor on saving
levels in general. We also do not find any effect on potential buyers.
8Including gender, education, working conditions, economic and personal financial situations within
Xit, as well as regional and monthly dummy variables
27
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS
Table 13: Policy Volume Effect - Savings Behaviour
(1) (2) (3)
Saving House Saver Potential Buyer
Post -0.0052 0.0077 0.0021
(0.013) (0.011) (0.020)
Observations 10,474 6,542 3,935
Sentiment Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this study, we use novel, nationally representative survey data on households in
Ireland before and after the unanticipated introduction of macroprudential mortgage
rules to explore the impact of loan-to-value and loan-to-income limits on household
savings. We exploit quasi-natural experimental variation across groups of households
who are a-priori expected to suffer from household downpayment and income con-
straints to test the impact of the regulations. Therefore, our study uniquely traces the
impact of changes in macroprudential policy on standard household finance issues.
We also build on existing studies by splitting households into those facing savings con-
straints (feel they are not saving sufficiently) and those saving to purchase a house to
better identify the effects of macroprudential regulations.
We find that households intending to purchase a home were more likely to expe-
rience savings constraints in response to the introduction of macroprudential policy.
Overall savings rates (including those households saving for unanticipated events or
other non-housing purchases) do not adjust, nor does the decision to purchase a home.
Instead this study reveals a greater difficulty amongst certain households in generating
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sufficient savings necessary to pursue homeownership. From our quasi-experimental
testing, we find that the effects are largest for younger households and those in the pri-
vate rental market; both groups of households are more likely to face downpayment
constraints when entering the housing market.
Supportive of the precautionary savings behaviour, we find that households who are
part of the private sector or indicate they see income shocks as the main risk they face,
are particularly exposed to this form of savings constraint pressure.
The macroprudential limits in the mortgage market are vital in ensuring financial
stability and limiting systemic risk. However, as is evident from our findings, they have
important heterogeneous effects across households, in particular on savings activity.
A number of implications arise for policy. This paper shows the incidence of these
policies is focused on specific subgroups of the population (young borrowers, renters)
and those likely to experience income uncertainty. As these policies have clear distri-
butional impacts, their calibration across groups are important. Indeed, frameworks
which disaggregate across potential buyer types, such as is the case with the Irish rules,
can limit some of the distributional consequences. Given these findings, the interac-
tion between macroprudential rules and broader housing market policies are also im-
portant to broad housing affordability goals can be met.
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Appendix
Table 14: Overview of Control Variables
Control Variable Description
Femaleti Dichotomized as female (1) or male (0),
Monthti Every even month between 2013M08 and 2016M06
Ageti Continuous variable, ranging from 16 to 99,
AgeGti Dichotomized as below 42 (1) or 42 and above (0) years of age,
NUTS3ti Categorical variable indicating household location across seven distinct regions;
Border, Dublin, MidEast, Midland, MidWest, Southeast, Southwest and West
Educationti Dichotomized as third level (1) or lower (0),
MaritalStatusti Categorical variable indicating marital status of respondent;
Married/Partner, Single, and Widowed/Divorced/Separated
Tenureti Dichotomized as homeowner (1) or private renter (2),
Childrenti Dichotomized as no children (0) or children (1),
WorkingStatusti Categorical variable indicating number of adults at work (over 18) in household;
No working adults (0), one working adult (1), and multiple working adults (2)
Occupationti Dichotomized as Professional/Technical (1) or Manual (2),
EmploymentGroupti Categorical variable indicating the employment status of respondent;
Employee (1), self-employed (2), and other (3)
EconomicOutlookti Categorical variable asking how the economic situation will develop in 12 months;
Better (1), Same (2), and Worse (3)
MajorPurchasesti Categorical variable asking if it is a good time to make large household purchases;
Good Time (1), Neither (2), and Bad Time (3)
FinancialPositionti Categorical variable asking self-perceived financial position of the househould;
Difficult (1), Moderate (2), and Easy (3)
FinancialExpectationsti Categorical variable asking how financial situation will change over next 12 months;
Better (1), Same (2), and Worse (3)
AffordabilityRiskti Categorical variable asking main risk of purchasing a home for respondent;
Dichotomized as Affordability (Income) Risk (1) or Other (0),
RegionalHousePricet−1i Continuous variable, year-on-year house price growth by Nuts3 region
RegionalUnemploymentRatet−1i Continuous variable, year-on-year unemployment rate by Nuts3 region
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